



2007

An Analysis of Executive Order 13224 and the "War on Terrorism"

Tyler Balding

Western Connecticut State University

Joshua Flores

Western Connecticut State University

Follow this and additional works at: <https://repository.wcsu.edu/ssj>

Recommended Citation

Balding, Tyler and Flores, Joshua (2007) "An Analysis of Executive Order 13224 and the "War on Terrorism"," *Social Sciences Journal*: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 , Article 13.

Available at: <https://repository.wcsu.edu/ssj/vol7/iss1/13>

An Analysis of Executive Order 13224 and the "War on Terrorism"

Tyler Balding and Joshua Flores

1. Purpose

Does the United States create terrorists? In debates on the "war on terrorism," this question has become taboo for Americans to discuss. Has the United States (U.S.) falsely perceived the impact of an active role in the Middle East? This paper seeks a correlation between U.S. actions in the "war on terrorism" and the potential for increased terrorist activity. Is terrorism on the rise? Is the United States responsible for terrorism on the rise? Throughout this paper we will look at terrorism, in the Middle East, over a period of time. We will determine whether for every U.S. action there is an equal and dangerous reaction by the Arab world.

2. The Global Hegemony Paradigm

The United States has declared war against an idea. Throughout the Middle East, terrorism evolved from a strategy of political change to include an expression of religious fundamentalism. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) stepped off stage for groups like Islamic Jihad, Ansar-Al-Islam, and Al-Qaeda. Political discussion and dissent, severely oppressed in most of the Middle East, re-emerged in religious discussion. "Indeed there could be no clearer example of this than Iran . . . a state in which the oppressed sought solace in religion, and the mosque became the center where opposition to the Shah could be articulated and organized, and from which the Ayatollahs emerged to fill the vacuum of political leadership" (Glyn Americans saw the reality of how religious fundamentalists have filled the political vacuum on September 11, 2001. The Bush Administration has placed terrorism as the highlight of our current foreign policy focus. "The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents (National Security Strategy 5)." The National Security Strategy goes on to say, "Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control and communications; material support, and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists' ability to plan and operate (5)."

As individuals based on a certain moral ethic, Americans seek an aggressive response to a massive loss of American life. As Omar Dahbour explains, "Two positions have been paramount in attempts to assess the ethics of terrorist acts such as 9/11. First, there is a stance of moral condemnation: Terrorist acts are always wrong. Second there is a stance of casual explanation: Nothing happens without reason, including the most heinous actions such as terrorist attacks (87)."

According to Dahbour, "From the first standpoint, any attempt at explanation of terrorist acts is ultimately an excuse for them—because explanation is seen as replacing moral censure (87)." Following the September 11th attacks, the idea that terrorist acts are always wrong is the dominant opinion among American political and military leaders, as well as the American public. Policies of the United States government, such as Executive order 13224, reflect this belief.

Executive order 13224 was approved by President Bush, to "disrupt the financial support network for terrorists and terrorist organizations," on September 23, 2001. The order "authorizes the United States government to designate and block the assets of foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism." The executive order goes further by defining terrorism for purposes of enforcement. Terrorism is defined as, "an activity that (1) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and appears (2) to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking." The definition that the Bush administration has adopted in Executive order 13224 fits perfectly within the perspective of the National Security Strategy. The information for the Executive order was obtained off of a government website: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm>

"To be ruled by reason, rather than by arbitrary will, is the very definition of freedom, personal and political (Grant 192)." Executive order 13224 defines terrorism with an assumption of arbitrary use of power in defiance of the rule of law.

What is not taken into consideration by the Executive order is the use of public opinion. American perception of itself within the Middle East carries an assumption of the correctness of our collective political thought and leaves open the potential for an Arab backlash. At some level the Al-Qaeda network thrives on a sense of defeat at the hands of the West. This propagand-


da serves as a tool to reinforce popular opinion toward actions by the United States and the governments the U.S. has supported. "Recent developments might be effectively parlayed as the latest in an ignominious series of historic Muslim defeats by the West that must now be avenged. Indeed the concept of vengeance has long figured prominently as a rallying cry in both Bin Laden's and Al-Qaeda's messages (Hoffman 5-6)."

3. Analysis of Data

The perspective the Bush Administration has predicated the conceptualism of terrorism as a systemic force that can be fought to a win or a loss. Terrorism is a vilified entity that must be destroyed. President Bush's stance is that, "You're either with us or against us," when it comes to terror. For other nation-states where questions of development and domestic quality of life take a higher role, President Bush and his "war on terrorism" have little impact. Terrorism is the major threat to a superpower of a global hegemony because all other immediate threats are obsolete in such a paradigm. An underlying belief that the occurrence of terrorism is on the rise and is becoming more pronounced is shown in how American foreign policy makers are framing their budgets and agendas. Our first analysis looks at the occurrence of terrorism to see if it has been rising as the American viewpoint seems to suggest.

An analysis of the total acts of terrorism from the year 1981 until the year 2004 was possible through figures obtained by the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database. This non-profit organization has integrated data from RAND Terrorism Chronology 1968-1997; RAND *MIPT Terrorism Incident Database (1998-present); Terrorism Indictment database (University of Arkansas); and DFI International's research on terrorist organizations. The data differs from other sources available such as one accessible on a government web domain: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20125.pdf>.

The information from the Knowledge Database is likely the most comprehensive and its information can be narrowed to look at specific criteria.



A regression model was used to assess the incidents of terrorism against the increase in time as an ordinal unit of one per year. Our Fig. 1a "Regression: Year/Incidents" shows the results of this analysis with a significance level of .002. A coefficient of 7.720 suggests that there is a trend of decrease of nearly eight incidents yearly over the past twenty-four years. This accounts for

only 2.5% of the total incidents occurring in 1981, the first year observed and as the data showed it is anything but a steady pattern of decrease. The data shows, regardless, that terrorism is, in fact, occurring less frequently. It appears that terrorism does exhibit the capabilities to show trends. Those trends just are not the same trends as is reflected by current U.S. policy. The less frequent occurrence of terrorism is correct for the span of time that we sampled but there have been relative rises of frequency during certain portions of the total time sequence.

Occasional spikes in the time line can be attributed to various occurrences. One significant example is a spike in terrorist activity that occurred in the years 1984-1985. During the early 1980's the Reagan administration attempted to act on a policy of diplomatic activism laid out in September 1982 under what has been called the "Reagan Plan." The United States would eventually withdraw from an active role following the major setback of the 1983 bombing of the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. Why then in during the end of 1984 and the beginning of 1985 was there a significant spike in terrorist activity?

The United States initially took an active role in the Middle East for three reasons. The first was to mitigate the role of Iran after the Islamic revolution in 1979. The second was to develop a settlement for the Lebanese Civil War and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The third was to devise a way to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Rubin 2). "The Reagan Plan proposed the establishment of a Jordanian-West Bank federation as a framework for Palestinian self-determination. It also suggested that, in exchange for Israel's yielding most of the occupied territory, the Arabs would recognize its statehood and agree to territorial compromise on the West Bank that would enhance Israel's security (Rubin 2)."

The spike in terrorist activity in 1984-1985 time spans is caused by the "experimentation of political alliances," and the growth of religious fundamentalism as a critic of Arab regimes supported by the United States. Jordan had allied itself with the Palestinian Liberation Organization to guarantee a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to co-opt the PLO's power over the West Bank. While Syria and Lebanon would join in the discussion there would emerge internal contradictions in the bargaining positions and goals of each State (Rubin 2).

Following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon, the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict attempted to take the matter into their own hands. "A conjunction of regional development in the opening months of 1985—a new, more flexible Government in Israel and King Husayn's seeming success in establishing a joint Jordanian–PLO bargaining position (Rubin 3).” The attempts at Middle Eastern peace set out by the Reagan administration would fail due to the "indeterminate policy of the PLO and the framework within which negotiations would be conducted (Rubin 4).” The paradigm within the Middle East had changed to allow the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. For the United States, according to Rubin, "Its attempts to solve—and its failure to resolve—the Arab-Israeli conflict often seemed to elicit acrimonious reactions in the area, yet it was still universally acknowledged that only Washington could foster any peaceful sentiment (12)."

Islamic fundamentalists would gain a foothold in Arab public opinion in 1991 during the first gulf war. A core argument of Al-Qaeda is the foothold that U.S. troops made by entering Saudi Arabia in 1991. "Seven years ago, he argued that the 'Crusader military forces' of the United States and United Kingdom had established a beachhead in Saudi Arabia from which they intended to impose a new imperialism on the Middle East in order to gain control over the regions oil wealth (Hoffman 4)."

Recruitment of new members to Al-Qaeda have centered on two arguments. The first is the existence of the State of Israel. The second is the presence of U.S. forces near the two holiest places in Islam; the cities of Mecca and Medina. Osama Bin Laden would begin his first jihad against the United States by declaring his opposition to the U.S. in the *Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places*. Web sites, which seek new members to Al-Qaeda, organize a simple logic; (1) the West is implacably hostile to Islam (2) the only way to address this threat and the only language that the West understands is the logic of violence and (3) jihad is the only option.

At the beginning of the new millennium we see a third spike in terrorist activity following the September 11th attacks. Islamic fundamentalists have used the concept of vengeance to gain support for new recruits. As the United States has pushed further into the Middle East, particularly Iraq, Al-Qaeda attempts to turn the situation to their advantage. "Particularly at a time when Al-Qaeda is weakened, the call for revenge coupled with the regenerative power of a single, new dramatic terrorist attack could breathe new life into the movement (Hoffman 6).” Terrorists have used the power of the Internet, such as the secretive Al Neda web site, to their advantage. "In particular, articles posted on the site have sought to draw a connection between the destruction of the World Trade Center and the cumulative blow struck against the U.S. economy by the September

11th attacks. Among the claims of proof the site offers are the weakening strength of the American dollar, the precipitous decline of the U.S. stock market, and the loss of confidence both at home and abroad in the American economy (Hoffman 11)."

Osama Bin Laden has thrived on, and is expecting, the persistence of U.S. forces. For terrorists there is a comparison between the current conflict and the Vietnam War. Since the invasion of Iraq, the conventional wisdom among Islamic groups has been that American forces will capitulate if drawn into a long struggle. As Bruce Hoffman explains, "Further, in a 9 April 2003 declaration posted on al Qaeda's phantom website, Al Neda. . . the virtues of guerrilla warfare are again lavishly extolled. . .


The Americans were defeated in Vietnam and the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan. This is the method that expelled the direct Crusader colonialism from most of the Muslim lands, with Algeria the most well known. However, these attempts have proven that the most effective method for the materially weak against the strong is guerilla warfare (Hoffman 7).

We can retroactively attribute increased terrorist involvement to specific macro policy changes. Even though certain regard must be taken for the very specific incidents that cause individuals to undertake extremism, the incidents should cumulatively reflect resentment toward circumstances that hegemonic policy permits or promotes. Evidence has shown it is not the case that terrorism has broadly become more frequent. The possibility that terrorism is a more serious problem since 2000 still exists because of terrorists whose actions result in more death and injury than in previous years. With the most devastating of all such attacks occurring within recent memory, it is understandable why there exists the impression that the lethality of terrorism is increasing.

Our second regression analysis of the ordinal value of the year to the total number of deaths is an attempt to display an answer to the proposition in the previous paragraph. The data again sampled was from 1981 annually through 2004. The sheer scale of the attacks on September 11, 2001 dwarfs the average level of casualties in an attack. Two models have been provided for this trend. The first model considers the 9/11 attacks as an outlier statistically. The second model includes the total in its calculation.

In brief summary of those results, neither model seemed to prove any significant statistic trend. It is impossible to tell whether terrorism is effectively becoming more lethal. Of the two figures, Fig. 2 "Regression: Years/Death", which includes the totals for September 11, 2001 is possibly closer to depicting a trend yet still falls far short of any acceptable significance level.


As our second undertaking in analysis of terrorism, we have gathered data on American budget allocations for two of the most obvious foreign policy tools; foreign aid and military expenditures. Military expenditures should conform to the current status of action the armed forces are experiencing and the general policy structure of the executive branch. Foreign aid seems less likely to have a tangible impact on the total number of terrorist incidents. U.S. Foreign aid is, however, often associated as a preventative method against terrorism. Among nation-states where free and open opinion is not tolerated it is not inconceivable



that foreign aid is somehow connected to terrorism as the most violent form of protest. The data for the budget was obtained off of a government website: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/hist.pdf>.

This figure suggests that there is some sort of connection between trends in the budget data for International Assistance Outlays and the total number of terrorist incidents in a given year. The significance level for this correlation is .007. As a check to this model, a testing of the yearly trend of the assistance outlays (Fig. 6) shows a stronger correlation for just a general decrease in the outlays along a yearly basis. This double correlation would not be problematic except that it makes it possible that simply both have decreasing slopes and that the significance in the regression could be accounted for by this similarity. It is possible to consider other factors as responsible because the isolated trends of yearly decrease are stronger than the cross correlation.

Statistical information for foreign aid shows an unfortunate discovery. Most public knowledge of foreign aid, in the U.S., shows a use of "soft power." Military aid, however, can be considered the majority of foreign aid given by the United States each year. According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, when ranked the top five recipients are Israel, Egypt, Columbia, Jordan, and Russia (812). "Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world, receiving just under one fifth of total U.S. foreign aid (Abdullah 3)." Were the data to be accepted as supporting a correlation then it would suggest that increases in foreign aid lead to increases in terrorism. This may sound ludicrous at first but it makes sense when considering that potentially controversial military aid to nation-states like Israel, Egypt, and Jordan are often categorized by the government as foreign assistance. This concept holds more legitimacy when one considers the waning acceptance of the corruption and restriction of right by the Egyptian and Jordanian governments as well as negative opinions many Muslim people have with the existence of the State of Israel.



Despite the results of International Assistance Outlays, the model illustrated in Fig. 5 "Def Outlays/Incidents" shows promise of a true correlation. The significance level of the connection between the percentage spent on the federal budget for military use and the amount of terrorist incidents is .000. This is the strongest correlation on all the models up to this point. This is stronger than the generally decreasing trend that is shown in the yearly amount of terrorist acts as per Fig. 1a.

Since the decrease in defense outlays more accurately follows its own inherent yearly trend and in turn the incidents strongly model the defense outlays trend, it is likely that the defense outlays are a factor of the incident model and not vice versa. The relationship shows that in the years that the global hegemony spends more on military expenses an increase in terrorist acts on an international basis can be expected.

"The presence of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain—as well as regular military training and exercises with Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco—is viewed as a new American colonialism and a way to strengthen American control over American control over Arab oil (Abdullah 6)." With military control, it is believed that political and economic control by the United States will follow. "Although the administration of President George W. Bush insists that the U.S. war on terrorism is not a war on Islam, this is not what is reported in the Arab media, in speeches by Arab leaders, and in the minds of many Arabs (Abdullah 6)."

Saudi Arabia is a clear example of a dangerous trend among Arab nations. The nation is one of the two intellectual centers for Islamic fundamentalism. "It needs to import technology, protect its borders, and create jobs for Saudis. However, Saudi internal politics meant that the state could strive for these goals only by getting the assent of its most conservative supporters—the Salafis (the U.S. press commonly refers to them as Wahhabis) (Seznec 58)." The 1.3 trillion dollars that Saudi Arabia has received from oil has seduced the house of Saud to rapidly modernize the country. "However, the Salafis do not wish to see Saudi modernity create a morally corrupt, westernized society that could turn people away from the worship of God (Seznec 58)."

Among Islamic fundamentalists, the perception is that corrupt governments are propped up by the United States. "It is worth noting here that the United States has provided many Arab countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and others with economic aid, however, the people saw that aid as U.S. support for the undemocratic regimes in those countries and not for real development (Abdullah 3)." Governments in the Middle East do not improve the situation for Arabs by continuing to invest in industrial infrastructure and not human capital. Arab education and wages are stagnant. The annual rate of growth in income has decreased substantially. "The continuation of the status quo in which millions of Arabs are oppressed and powerless is the main reason for the Islamization of the Arab masses, who can only join Islamic organizations or become more religious since political parties, political participation, free press, and speech are forbidden. Arab regimes deny their people democracy, but cannot prevent them from joining Islamic organizations or becoming more religious, since to do so would be interpreted as hostility towards Islam (Abdullah 8)." Foreign and Military aid by the United States to the Arab world will increase the likelihood of terrorist activity through individuals which seek political participation through the only means available, the mosque.


The United Nations human development program has monitored the development of the Arab world through the Alternative Human Development Index (*The Economist* 2). This Index has been part of an Arab Human Development Report developed by the United Nations each year.

The barrier to better Arab performance is not a lack of resources, concludes the report, but the lamentable shortage of three essentials: freedom, knowledge, and womanpower. Not having enough of these amounts to what the authors call the region's three 'deficits.' It is these deficits, they argue, that hold the frustrated Arabs back from reaching their potential—and allow the rest of the world to despise and to fear a deadly combination of wealth and backwardness (*The Economist* 3).

A final model (see next page) looks specifically at a recent act designed to combat terrorism and attempts to evaluate its successfulness. This act is Executive Order 13224. Our analysis of terrorist activity cited 13224 for the definition of terrorism used by the government. The executive order has more impact on our research as a gauge of whether or not the tactics of the United States in the "War on Terrorism" are actually working. Executive Order 13224 declared a state of national emergency following the September 11th attacks. "In general terms, the Order provides a means by which to disrupt the financial support network for terrorists and terrorist organizations by authorizing the U.S. government to designate and block the assets of foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism." The following information for the executive order was obtained off of a government website: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm>.

Conventional wisdom among the U.S. military acknowledges the enormous financial base of Osama Bin Laden. Al-Qaeda in its initial days was single handedly financed by the Bin Laden fortune. The U.S. government believes that by freezing the assets of Bin Laden the financial base of the organization will dry up. The order is intended to allow the U.S. government to take several legal actions. Property and interest in property that comes within possession of the United States, or U.S. persons are blocked. Any transaction or dealing with U.S. persons or within the United States in property or interests in property is prohibited. Any transaction to evade the executive order or conspiracy to violate the executive order is illegal. Finally, civil and

Analyzing Ex. Order 13224



criminal penalties may be assessed for violations.

Several assumptions about the effects of 13224 create problems for enforcement. First is the focus on areas where the U.S. government has jurisdiction. Jurisdiction includes U.S. sovereign territory, and areas of U.S. occupation. Current leadership of Al-Qaeda resides in geographic "no man's land" beyond the range of U.S. troops. The guarantee of sovereign governments to take action on 13224 is not guaranteed. The executive order is not a treaty binding with other nations but an executive order of the President of the United States. As is suggested by the government web site, use by other nation-states of 13224 is a service of the United States and not a requirement.

The effects of 13224 are intended as a deterrent to support for Islamic fundamentalist causes. Donations or contributions to designated individuals or entities are avoided. Public awareness of individuals or entities linked to terrorism should be heightened. General information for other sovereign nations, allied with the United States, become available. The most controversial claim of 13224 is that it will disrupt terrorist networks, cutting off access to financial and other resources from sympathizers, thereby encouraging individuals and entities to get out of the "terrorism business." The information for the Executive order was obtained off of a government website: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm>.

Our evidence shows that as the coverage of order 13224 broadens to freeze assets of more terrorists and terrorist support groups there is no discernable decrease in the number of acts committed over a corresponding time frame. If anything the relationship is positive in nature and acts of terrorism have been occurring more frequently over time. We cannot guarantee that the executive order has been entirely ineffectual; however, there is no evidence available to say that the order is successful. There is a possibility that the Middle East is experiencing a spike in terrorist activity, which is being softened by U.S. policy such as 13224. Our data, however, suggests that the act is not actively stopping an increase in terrorism.

The list of groups identified is largely composed of Arab groups and is acting to stops millions upon millions of funds. It is important that the fact that incidents are not being stopped by this act is observed when it is time for future policy changes. Either the method the act is pursuing is wrong or terrorist agencies rely less on funding than the pentagon suspects. While our research does not support the removal of the act, it does suggest that in itself it is entirely inadequate and that the final answer rest elsewhere from asset freezes.

Al-Qaeda itself, although a loosely organized structure, is designed around a current business model. As we mentioned, Osama Bin Laden has an extremely large financial base, which has been used to finance the Al-Qaeda organization. It may be troubling for the corporate world to know that an international terrorist has picked up the business skills they use.

Just as large, multinational business conglomerates moved during the 1990's to more linear, flatter and networked structures, bin Laden did the same with

al-Qaeda. On the one hand, bin Laden has functioned like the president or CEO of a large multinational corporation by defining specific goals and aims, issuing orders and ensuring their implementation (Hoffman 3).

Al-Qaeda is the use of the tools of globalization against globalization. Bin Laden is trained in the modern techniques of business and has used them to achieve fundamentalist ends. It is a reflection of the "best of both worlds" that the Wahhabis have sought in Saudi Arabia. "Bin Laden, though is perhaps best viewed as a terrorist CEO, essentially having applied business administration and modern management techniques learned both at university and in the family's construction business to the running of a transnational terrorist organization (Hoffman 4)."

Conclusion

In the statement of purpose to this paper we had asked the reader, "Does the U.S. create terrorists?" Perhaps it would be more appropriate to ask a different question. Does the United States see who and what it is they are fighting in this "war on terrorism?" As the superpower of a global hegemony, the perspective of the United States is altered compared to other individuals or entities. The response of the U.S. immediately following the September 11th attacks can be justified and to the world seemed appropriate. After four years we have begun to question the initial effectiveness of our actions. Our response has to evolve to meet the reality of what we face in the future.

"Put another way, what is the 'ethical world' or 'moral universal' within which terrorism exists—and even seems justifiable to many people. One answer to this question is that terrorism occurs in the moral universe of imperialism, because empires are precisely those ethically corrupt states that engender reactions such as terrorism (though not only that reaction) (Dahbour 91)." In a discussion on terrorism, pure innocents, nor complete guilt, of the United States should be considered.

The United States has engaged in two actions, which have drawn the wrath of Islamic fundamentalists. Support for corrupt Arab governments is one. Blind support for the State of Israel, despite its actions in the Arab-Israeli conflict, is the second. For the protection of U.S. oil interests corrupt, oppressive governments have been propped up by both "soft" and "hard" power for too long.

But the Arab people don't appreciate U.S. economic and military aid to those countries because they believe that U.S. aid simply supports those undemocratic regimes and not the countries people. Of course, Arab regimes, and Arab media discuss U.S. aid to their own countries very much, and this has led many to think that a large part of this aid eventually ends up in the private accounts of corrupt members of the regimes (Abdullah 5).

In the context of globalization, both the U.S. and the Arab world have to overcome a cultural learning curve. "It is evident that it is Globalization. . . as the spread of formerly Western social and cultural relations, modes of interaction, attitudes, values and beliefs etc. facilitated by advances in communication and other technologies associated therewith—that has become the immediate issue (Glynn 121)." Cultural elites, like the Wahhabis, are facing the influx of information that they believe can undermine their strength and the strength of a religious argument. Breakdown of community and social responsibility, the breakdown of the family, sexual promiscuity, and drug abuse are blamed on Western culture. The positives of western philosophical concepts that little argue are ignored, "Liberal nationalism is characterized by constitutional democracy, including a strong commitment to religious and ethnic impartiality and inclusiveness, or the equal freedom of all, regardless of religious and other particularistic forms of identity (23)."

One can compare the apocalyptic message to how Christian fundamentalists warn of the destruction of American society. Within the U.S. response to the September 11th attacks there is a distinct religious tone. "The suggestion that it is the United States' responsibility or the responsibility of an earthly power, to 'rid the world of evil' is close to idolatry from an orthodox Christian point of view (Little 22)." The United States must escape the paradigm of power among sovereign nations, which is used for "security" and "stability" to look at power to stand for competing social and civic claims.

Blind support for Israel, in light of abuses against Palestinians, will be much more painful for the U.S. to come to terms with in the Arab world. To many Palestinians, the State of Israel is a state sponsored terrorist. To Arabs there are many documented times where terrorism was committed by Israel against Palestinians. Activities of the Stern Gang are well remembered (Glynn 119). "And of course, any Israeli military forces which may be currently engaged in targeting noncombatant civilians.

And the members of any government, such as that of the governments they represent, are, on this view, terrorists as well (Glynn 119)."

"The question that the Arabs have continuously asked themselves for the last half-century is why the United States provides Israel with such generous political, economic, and military support. The answer that has been given to them is that the West and especially America created Israel and that Israel was their only reliable strategic alliance against the Soviet bloc during the Cold War and is still their outpost in their efforts to control the area (Abdullah 5)." As the founder of the State of Israel in 1948, the United States will always have a vested interest in the survival of Israel. A strong pro-Israeli lobby in the United States continues to push for stronger support of the political, economic, and military needs of the State. For the United States to truly begin to make footholds in the Middle East it must come to terms with its past support of corrupt Arab dictators and blind loyalty to Israel. Arabs throughout the Middle East are aware of these relationships and see clearly the hypocrisy of a nation, which claims to preserve, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

References

Abdallah, Abdel Mahdi. "Causes of Anti-American in the Arab World: A Socio-political Perspective." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* December 2003.

Dahbour, Omar. "The Response to Terrorism: Moral Condemnation or Ethical Judgment?" *The Philosophical Forum* Volume XXXVI, No 1. Spring 2005: 87.

"Self-doomed to Failure" *The Economist* June 4, 2002.

Glynn, Simon. "Deconstructing Terrorism." *The Philosophical Forum* Volume XXXVI, No 1, Spring 2005: 113.

Grant, Ruth W. *John Locke's Liberalism*. Chicago, 1987.

Hoffman, Bruce. "Al-Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An Assessment." 5 May 2003
<<http://www.rand.org/p/p8078>>.

Hoffman, Bruce. "What Can We Learn from the Terrorists?" *Global Agenda*, Spring 2005.

Little, David. "Phenomena of Faith: Religious Dimensions of Conflict and Peace, An Interview with David Little." *Harvard International Review* Winter 2005: 20.

"The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." September 2002.
<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/>>.

Rubin, Barry. "The United States and the Middle East, 1984-1985." *Middle East Review of International Affairs*.
http://meria.idc.ac.il/u_s-policy/data1984.html.

Seznec, Jean Francois. "Business as Usual: The Saudi-U.S. Relationship." *Harvard Business Review* Winter 2005: 56.

United States. Department of State. *Fact Sheet: Executive Order 13224*. December 20, 2002
<<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm>>.

—. Department of Commerce. "Statistical Abstracts of the United States: 2003" *U.S. Census Bureau*. December 2003.